What is the difference between imperialism and globalism

International Relations Religion Education Sports. Search form Search. Connecting History. Hot off the Press. History Talk. Lesson Plan Author s :. Teaching Area:. Grade Level:. Sign in. Essay Sample Check Writing Quality. Show More. Read More. Words: - Pages: 4. Cultural Implications Of Globalization The influence of globalization on culture has implications on societies, nations and even organizations.

Words: - Pages: 9. Education Privatization Some theorists argue that since countries compete at a global scale to export their products and attract foreign investment, governments engage in similar policies in order to reduce the barriers for trade and exchange Green ; Twining The Gold Standard Making the equality from the gold standard actually hindering the production possibilities by having united trade rates.

Words: - Pages: 7. Words: - Pages: 3. Advantages And Disadvantages Of Trade Protectionism Another disadvantage of trade protectionism is it leads to smuggling goods. Disadvantages Of International Trade Globalization is the interlink of different parts of the globe related to their economic, social, cultural, and political means.

Essay On Immigration And Globalization In recent decades, the term globalization has surfaced as one of the primary terms used to describe the contemporary world. Culturalism, as I have said elsewhere, is not a complement to democracy, a means of applying it concretely, but on the contrary a contradiction to it.

So there is an element of subjectivity, of intuition, that cannot be eliminated. It is especially hard to make predictions in a period like ours, when all the ideological and political mechanisms that governed the behavior of the various actors have disappeared. When the post-Second World War period came to an end, the structure of political life collapsed.

Political life and political struggles had traditionally been conducted in the context of political states, whose legitimacy was not questioned the legitimacy of a government could be questioned, but not that of the state. But now we find that almost everywhere in the world these institutions have to one degree or another lost a good part, if not all, of their legitimacy.

This new political life is therefore highly unstable. It would be worth discussing concretely the relation between these demands and movements and the radical critique of society that is, of really existing capitalism and globalized neoliberal management. Because some of these movements join—or could join—in the conscious rejection of the society projected by the dominant powers; others on the contrary, take no interest in it and do nothing to oppose it.

The dominant powers are able to make this distinction, and they make it. Some movements they manipulate and support, openly or covertly; others they resolutely combat—that is the rule in this new and unsettled political life.

There is a global political strategy for world management. The objective of this strategy is to bring about the greatest possible fragmentation of the forces potentially hostile to the system by fostering the breakup of the state forms of organization of society. As many Slovenias, Chechnyas, Kosovos, and Kuwaits as possible! In this connection, the opportunity of using, even manipulating, demands based on separate identity is welcome.

The question of community identity—ethnic, religious, or other—is therefore one of the central questions of our time. The basic democratic principle, which implies real respect for diversity national, ethnic, religious, cultural, ideological , can tolerate no breach. The only way to manage diversity is by practicing genuine democracy. Failing that, it inevitably becomes an instrument that the adversary can use for his less often her own ends. But in this respect the various lefts in history have often been lacking.

Not always, of course, and much less so than is frequently said today. In the Third World of the Bandung period the national liberation movements often managed to unite different ethnic groups and religious communities against the imperialist enemy. Many ruling classes in the first generation of African states were really transethnic. But very few powers were able to manage diversity democratically, or, when gains were made, to maintain them.

Their weak inclination for democracy gave results as deplorable in this domain as in the management of the other problems of their societies. Even in many authentic bourgeois democracies, however, community diversity is far from having always been managed correctly.

Northern Ireland is the most striking example. Culturalism has been successful to the degree that democratic management of diversity has failed. This last is often the case with religious culturalisms, which easily slide toward obscurantism and fanaticism. To sort out this tangle of demands based on identity, I would propose what I think is an essential criterion.

Those movements whose demands are connected with the fight against social exploitation and for greater democracy in every domain are progressive. Dominant capital knows this, by the way, and supports their demands even when the media take advantage of their barbarous content to denounce the peoples who are its victims!

Democracy and the rights of peoples, which the same representatives of dominant capital invoke today, are hardly conceived to be more than the political means of neoliberal management of the contemporary world crisis, complementing the economic means. The democracy in question depends on cases. Hence the systematic application of the double standard. No question of intervening in favor of democracy in Afghanistan or the countries of the Persian Gulf, for example, any more than of getting in the way of Mobutu yesterday, of Savimbi today, or of many others tomorrow.

The rights of peoples are sacred in certain cases today in Kosovo, tomorrow perhaps in Tibet , forgotten in others Palestine, Turkish Kurdistan, Cyprus, the Serbs of Krajina whom the Croatian regime has expelled by armed force, etc.

Even the terrible genocide in Rwanda occasioned no serious inquiry into the share of responsibility of the states that gave diplomatic support to the governments that were openly preparing it. No doubt the abominable behavior of certain regimes facilitates the task by providing pretexts that are easy to exploit. But the complicitous silence in other cases takes away all credibility from the talk of democracy and the rights of peoples. One could not do less to meet the fundamental requirements of the struggle for democracy and respect for peoples, without which there can be no progress.

That being fortunately the case, in the new phase we are already witnessing the rise of struggles involving the working people who are victims of the system. Landless peasants in Brazil; wage earners and unemployed, in solidarity, in some European countries; unions that include the great majority of wage earners as in Korea or South Africa ; young people and students carrying along with them the urban working classes as in Indonesia —the list grows longer every day.

These social struggles are bound to expand. They will surely be very pluralistic, which is one of the positive characteristics of our time. They will, of course, have to confront different obstacles to their development, depending on time and place. The central question here is what the relation will be between the overriding conflicts, by which I mean the global conflicts between the various dominant classes—that is, the states—whose possible geometry I have tried to outline above.

Which will carry the day? Will the social struggles be subordinated, contained within the larger global-imperialist context of the conflicts, and therefore mastered by the dominant powers, even mobilized for their purposes, if not always manipulated?

Though both nations did continue to display imperialistic tendencies towards countries in their respective "backyards" Soviets in eastern Europe and central Asia, the US in central and southern America. What may be more relevant to this question were the less explicit policies of exerting control over foreign countries that became known as Neocolonialism. I would posit that there are two types of neocolonialism, intentional and unintentional in respect to the countries that stand to benefit.

The growth of the economic influence of a country and thus the spread of its multinational companies and their respective influence is, in essence, an organic process. It is not necessarily always a good one for all involved, but it has in aggregate been beneficial globally. It is the intentional abuse of this influence by a country that can hide imperialism behind the guise of a globalized financial system. This is something the United States did its fair share of at the zenith of the cold war, and something that China is doing today.

The general strategy is this: approach a less-developed country and give estimates on the economic viability of [large infrastructure project], knowing that the estimate isn't accurate, have the country take out a loan to pay for the project, the great power builds the project, the economic gains do not materialize at the scale promised, and that country is now in debt to the great power.

The global financial framework legitimizes this type of exchange, in which now the great power has undue influence over the less-developed country. To answer your question concisely : Imperialism and globalization are not the same. Imperialism is an explicit policy by a country of control of another, whereas globalization is the mostly organic result of several decades of growing connections between the economies of the world. However, the financial framework that has come about from globalization has the potential to be abused by economically powerful nations to exert undue influence over less-developed countries.

After reading your comment below Gramatik's answer, you seem to be asking if the outcomes of globalization aren't effectively the same as those of imperialism. I think this is a more difficult question because imperialism often increased trade, a hallmark of globalisation. The real question is what kind of trade. The first forms of globalisation are linked in part to the great empires that, by politically unifying very vast and disparate territories, enhanced the movement of goods and people across continents.

From the 6th to the 4th century BC, merchants crisscrossed the vast Persian Empire, which spread from the Mediterranean to the River Ganges and covered a mosaic of peoples and civilisations. This period of cultural integration of disparate peoples demonstrated by the Great Library of Alexandria also spread trading techniques, like the use of currency. The city-states of the post-Macedonian Hellenistic civilisation took advantage of the expanded borders and continued to engage heavily in essentially maritime trade.

Trade grew considerably worldwide thanks to metropolises and their colonies, but the major powers jealously defended their trading areas by applying protectionist measures, according to the then dominant political economy theory — mercantilism.

To grow richer, the state — at the heart of the economy — had to develop international trade and increase its exports by exploiting the resources of colonial territories. But the tariff schedule forced certain colonies to trade solely with their ruling kingdom and so the international trading posts on different continents stayed attached to their respective crowns Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, France, Great Britain, etc.

Guadeloupe, a French possession, could only trade with French intermediaries. I think it's obvious that given the backlash against globalization in some developed countries today that they are no longer in a position to exercise this kind of exploitative trade that characterised colonialism.

I can elaborate more on this if you want me to, but it seems obvious enough to me. So real difficulty with your question is defining imperialism, e. Before the effects of neo-globalisation, imperialism was all so simple.

Writers such as Luxemburg, Lenin and Bukharin examined how factors, such as the rise of monopoly capitalism and the internationalisation of capital and labour exploitation, were directly linked to the expansion of Western imperial empire and inter-imperial conflict in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

At the mid-point of the twentieth century, in the midst of the rise of US geo-political hegemony and the onset of decolonisation, dependency theory would advance this idea of a Western-centred imperial world order. This created a neo-imperial order where newly independent Third World countries were perpetually placed on the outer-limits of the global economy, providing raw materials, natural resources and inflows of capital to industrialised countries in the West and unable to develop their own industries and infrastructure free of Western interference.